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Abstract 
This paper develops a comprehensive theory of support for democracy. Building on 
instrumental and culturalist approaches, the theory argues that experience with democracy 
conditions the extent to which economic and political performance inform support. 
Specifically, it argues that the extent to which economic performance informs support 
should decline as a democracy grows older, while the opposite should be true about 
political performance. These arguments are evaluated using multilevel models to analyse 
cross-national survey data for 21 Latin American countries. The evidence indicates that 
both economic and political performance inform support for democracy and that the extent 
to which economic performance informs support declines as a democracy grows older. 
Although the importance of political performance does not seem to be conditioned by 
democratic experience, its importance in relation to economic performance does increase 
as a democracy matures. The evidence also indicates that experience with democracy, and 
not level of economic development, is what conditions the importance of economic 
performance. Altogether, these results suggest that support for democracy and a civic 
culture that values the political goods that democracy can deliver are more likely to be a 
consequence of, rather than a prerequisite for, the survival and eventual consolidation of 
democracy. 
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1 Introduction 
Political scientists have long been preoccupied with understanding support for democracy as 
well as its relationship with democratic stability. Despite the numerous studies devoted to 
these topics, crucial controversies remain regarding what explains support. There are major 
differences between two theoretical paradigms. One argues that support for democracy is 
shaped by citizens’ instrumental assessments of regime performance: they support the 
regime if it satisfies their standards of performance and withdraw their support if it does not 
(e.g., Lipset 1959; Przeworski 1991). Within this camp, however, scholars disagree about 
whether the economic or the political dimensions of performance are more important in 
informing support; they also disagree about the extent to which these dimensions are 
equally important in new and old democracies. 
The second camp argues that support for democracy is reflective of individuals’ values 
and that these, in turn, are determined by underlying levels of economic development 
(e.g., Inglehart 1997; Inglehart / Welzel 2005). Specifically, this camp argues that early 
economic development brings about secular and rational values that are associated with 
high levels of support for democracy. In turn, post-industrial development brings about 
“self-expression values” such as freedom of expression and creativity that are associated 
with greater dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy, but a higher level of support 
for democratic values and ideals. According to this camp, then, the relationship between 
performance and support for democracy is spurious. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, empirical analysis to date has been unable to settle these 
controversies. Most studies have been carried out within one of these theoretical 
paradigms and have been more concerned with advancing their arguments rather than with 
confronting them with alternative explanations. The few studies that have managed to 
avoid this have portrayed the arguments of the two camps as inherently competing (e.g., 
Mishler / Rose 2001a; Anderson s. a.). Moreover, studies within the instrumental approach 
have been particularly concerned with examining whether specific performance criteria 
matter in particular contexts, rather than with exploring why these criteria matter when 
and where they do (e.g., Mattes / Bratton 2007). These studies have been relatively quick 
to accept that there are differences in the determinants of support across new and old 
democracies without trying to explain what underlies these differences. 
In sum, scholars of support for democracy have failed to develop a comprehensive theory 
that can integrate existing knowledge and settle the ongoing controversies within and across 
the two camps. The goal of this paper is to develop and evaluate such a comprehensive 
theory. This theory seeks to answer the following questions: Does performance inform 
support or is the relationship between the two a reflection of shifts in underlying values? If 
performance informs support, are economic and political dimensions of performance 
equally important across new and old democracies? And, finally, what accounts for the 
differences in the determinants of support across new and old democracies? 
Building on instrumental approaches, the theory contends that performance considerations 
do inform support for democracy: citizens evaluate performance in the provision of 
economic and politically desirable goods and lend their support to the regime if it delivers. 
Cultural approaches suggest that the criteria of performance that citizens use in their 
judgements may change. Along these lines, the theory contends that a regime’s capacity to 
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deliver economically desirable outcomes becomes less important in shaping support as a 
democracy grows older. In contrast, the importance of political performance should 
increase. The theory attributes these differences to the democratic experience of a country, 
and not to its level of economic development. The longer the experience with democracy, 
the more the political sphere becomes autonomous vis-à-vis the social and economic 
spheres and the citizens’ orientations become more civic (Diamond 1999, 162; Schmitter / 
Karl 1991, 57). 
The paper evaluates these arguments by estimating multilevel models of support for 
democracy, using public opinion data from 21 Latin American countries. The results 
indicate that economic and political performance assessments shape support for democracy 
to the same extent in countries with no experience with democracy. The results also indicate 
that the importance of economic performance declines with democratic experience (and not 
with level of economic development), while the importance of political performance does 
not seem to be mediated by democratic experience. Taken together, these findings indicate 
that the importance of political performance relative to that of economic performance in 
informing support for democracy increases with democratic experience. Finally, the 
evidence indicates that experience with democracy, and not level of economic development, 
is what conditions the importance of economic performance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section synthesizes the 
main theoretical developments in the study of support for democracy. The third section 
discusses the concept of support and develops a comprehensive theory of support for 
democracy. The fourth section lays out the empirical strategy for evaluating this theory, 
and the fifth presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes. 
2 Support for democracy, old and new 
According to the instrumental approach, support for democracy is based on citizens’ 
instrumental assessments of regime performance: they support the regime if it satisfies 
their standards of performance and withdraw their support if it does not. Thus, 
democracies that are effective at delivering valued economic and political goods to their 
citizens will enjoy higher levels of support than those that are unable to do so. Within this 
perspective, however, scholars differ on the criteria of performance that citizens use in 
their judgements. 
A first generation of scholars focused on the socio-economic changes brought about by 
modernization as the driving force behind support for and the ultimate survival of 
democracy (e.g., Lipset 1959; Lerner 1958).1 Increases in living standards and educational 
attainment brought about by industrialization and urbanization were viewed as the 
material preconditions that would allow democratic legitimacy to develop. Subsequent 
studies moved away from modernization theory and toned down arguments about material 
                                                 
1  The distinction between, and characterization of, “first generation” and “second generation“ theorists 
within the instrumental camp is borrowed from Evans and Whitefield (1995, 485–487). It is worth 
noting that these authors fail to fully acknowledge the cultural approach in their discussion, either as a 
refinement of first-generation theories or as an independent research programme. 
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preconditions, but still stressed that citizens’ support for democracy was ultimately 
contingent on economic outcomes. Accordingly, studies within this tradition analysed the 
effects of objective indicators of macroeconomic and social conditions as well as citizens’ 
evaluations of these conditions (e.g., Clarke / Dutt / Kornberg 1993; Kornberg / Clarke 
1992; Weatherford 1984, 1987). 
As the so-called “Third Wave of Democratization” (Huntington 1991) unfolded, 
modernization theory progressively fell out of favour. Accordingly, a second generation of 
instrumental theorists abandoned the exclusive focus on socio-economic outcomes and 
examined instead the relationship between support for democracy and a variety of political 
factors, such as institutional arrangements (e.g., Anderson / Guillory 1997; Norris 1999b), 
presidential and parliamentary approval (e.g., Hetherington 1998) and corruption (e.g., 
della Porta 2000; Pharr 2000; Seligson 2002). Some of these more recent studies analysed 
performance in both the economic and the political realms (e.g., Bratton / Mattes 2001; 
Evans / Whitefield 1995; Mattes / Bratton 2007). Their general conclusion was that while 
economic performance was important in explaining support, political performance was 
also relevant. In fact, political factors seemed to matter more than economic factors. 
According to the cultural approach, support for democracy reflects individuals’ values, 
which in turn shift following structural transformation processes. Early culturalists argued 
that democracy was possible only in societies where a civic culture was already in place 
(Almond / Verba, 1963). Building on modernization theory, these scholars attributed the 
prevalence of authoritarian regimes and the failure of democracy in underdeveloped 
countries to economic backwardness and to traditional institutions and values (Almond / 
Coleman 1960; Almond / Powell 1966). As in the case of first-generation instrumental 
scholars, these claims were severely questioned in the aftermath of the Third Wave.2 
More recently, a number of scholars revamped the basic arguments of the cultural 
approach (e.g., Dalton 2000; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart / Welzel 2005). Unlike their 
predecessors, these scholars recognized that cultural shifts are path-dependent and thus 
they abandoned earlier predictions of universal cultural convergence driven by capitalist 
development. However, they still claimed that cultural shifts followed economic 
development in predictable ways. First, modernization brings about secular and rational 
values, which are the foundations for a political culture based on respect for rational 
authority. In such contexts, they argued, one would expect to observe relatively high 
levels of support for democracy. 
In turn, post-modernization is associated with the primacy of personal choice, autonomy and 
creativity. This increase in “self-expression values” is associated with greater dissatisfaction 
with the workings of democracy, as citizens set higher standards for performance. At the 
same time, it is associated with a higher level of support for democratic values and ideals – 
or support for democracy in the abstract – as only this type of regime allows for the 
protection of freedom and liberties. Accordingly, post-industrial societies are populated by 
“critical citizens” who distrust political institutions and authorities and set increasingly 
higher standards of regime performance, but still place great value on democracy (Norris 
                                                 
2  In particular, a number of studies successfully challenged the culturalist contention that the existence of 
a civic culture was a necessary condition for the emergence and subsequent consolidation of democracy 
(e.g., Muller / Seligson 1994; Seligson / Booth 1993). 
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1999a). Like their predecessors, new culturalists contended that support for democracy 
changed incrementally, in a process driven by the structural transformations associated 
with modernization and post-modernization. At the individual level, citizens’ position in 
the social structure conditions the extent to which they experience economic development 
and shift from secular-rational values to self-expression values. This shift in turn informs 
their judgements about democracy. 
While numerous studies have found support for both the instrumental and the cultural 
approaches, there are still a number of unsettled debates regarding the factors that 
ultimately shape support for democracy. Several reasons underlie this state of affairs. 
First, most studies have been carried out within a single paradigm and thus have failed to 
examine the alternative one. And the few studies that have attempted to bridge this divide 
(e.g., Mishler / Rose 2001a; Anderson, s. a.) have portrayed the instrumental and cultural 
approaches as inherently competing. As a result, they have not explored the potential of 
integrating the two into a comprehensive theory of support for democracy. 
Second, most studies have failed to bridge the gap between what Weatherford (1991, 52) 
identifies as the aggregate and the individual levels of analysis. Indeed, little is known 
about the effects of system-level factors on individual-level support.3 Furthermore, as will 
be discussed later in the paper, the few studies that have made progress in this direction 
have methodological limitations that undermine their contributions (e.g., Anderson / 
Guillory 1997; Bratton / Mattes 2001; Norris 1999b). 
Finally, most cross-national studies have focused on explaining support for democracy in 
a single region of the world, such as Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, and 
Africa (but see Anderson, s. a.). While this strategy is in principle compatible with the 
development of general theory, in practice, these studies have had very idiosyncratic 
goals. In particular, existing studies have neglected to theorize about why causation 
patterns of support might differ across contexts and this has limited their ability to make 
progress in developing a theory of support that is sensitive to these potential differences. 
The following section develops such a theory, arguing that experience with democracy is 
crucial to understanding differences across contexts. 
3 A comprehensive theory of support for democracy 
The basic premise underlying the theory advanced in this paper is that performance shapes 
support for democracy. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that citizens will lend unconditional 
support to a regime that is consistently unable to deliver economic or political goods. 
Revisiting discussions around the concept of “regime support” helps to lay the foundation 
for this premise. Early conceptualizations sought to distinguish between two dimensions 
of support: one that is performance-based, reflective of system outputs, and another that 
reflects citizens’ affective bonds to the regime. In what is probably the most cited work on 
the topic, Easton (1975) coined the terms “specific support” and “diffuse support” to 
distinguish between these two dimensions: 
                                                 
3  According to Weatherford (1991, 52), bridging this gap would also entail studying the implications of 
varying levels of support on system-level outcomes, such as regime stability. 
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“Some types of evaluations are closely related to what the political authorities do and 
how they do it. Others are more fundamental in character because they are directed 
to basic aspects of the system. They represent more enduring bonds […]. The 
distinction of roughly this sort I have called ‘specific’ as against ‘diffuse’ support.” 
(p. 437) 
Similarly, Lipset (1959) introduced a distinction between “effectiveness” and “legitimacy”. 
The former referred to “the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of 
government as most of the population […] see them”; the latter, to “the capacity of the 
system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the 
most appropriate ones for the society” (p. 86). At the conceptual level, then, it is possible 
– and arguably sensible – to establish a distinction between performance-based, 
instrumental and affective dimensions of regime support. 
According to these early conceptualizations, variations in instrumental support did not 
threaten the survival of democracies as long as there was a reservoir of affective support 
among the citizenry. Long periods of underperformance might eventually lead to regime 
demise, however, by way of a gradual corrosion of such a reservoir. In contexts where 
reservoirs of affective support were lacking, such as in the case of new democracies, the 
survival of the regime was hypothesized to hinge solely on performance (Lipset 1959; 
Easton 1965). 
Since then, there have been a number of important contributions to the conceptualization 
and measurement of political support (e.g., Citrin 1974; Craig 1993; Hibbing / Theiss-
Morse 1995; Muller / Jukam 1977; Weatherford 1992). These contributions agree that no 
item purely measures either the instrumental or the affective dimensions of support. It is 
possible, however, to distinguish between items that are more reflective of each of these 
dimensions. Presidential and parliamentary approval measures, for example, are generally 
considered to be more reflective of instrumental considerations directed at authorities. In 
turn, “trust in government” and “satisfaction with democracy” items are generally 
considered to be reflective of both instrumental and affective considerations (Hetherington 
1998, 791–792; Anderson / Guillory 1997, 70–71). Finally, it is generally accepted that 
items that gauge commitment to democracy in the abstract reflect support for the 
“principles of democracy as an ideal form of government” to a greater extent than 
assessments of its “actual practice” (Evans / Whitefield 1995, 488).  
This discussion suggests that support for democracy, however measured, will inevitably 
reflect instrumental considerations, albeit to varying degrees. Building on instrumental 
approaches, the first expectation of the theory developed here is that support for 
democracy should be informed by performance assessments. To rule out the possibility 
that this relationship is spurious and reflective of underlying values, performance should 
inform support independently of values and socio-economic covariates, which are 
indicative of the extent to which individuals experience the structural transformations that 
result in value shifts. This first expectation is reflected in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Better performance should be associated with higher levels of support for 
democracy, independent of values and socio-economic covariates. 
An important consideration is whether the extent to which performance shapes support 
differs across new democracies and their older, more consolidated counterparts. Although 
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there is no definitive consensus on this topic, a popular view among scholars is that 
support in new democracies is more contingent on performance than in old democracies. 
According to Mishler / Rose (1999): 
“Whereas support for established democracies is relatively viscous, changing only 
slowly and incrementally over time, support for new democracies is potentially much 
more volatile. Contributing to this volatility is the likelihood that support for new 
regimes depends more heavily on regime performance. An established democracy 
benefits because citizens are socialized to support the regime from childhood. By 
contrast, citizens in a new democracy were socialized into a different political order. 
In the short term, a new regime may benefit from a degree of popular acceptance and 
approval resulting from the public’s rejection of the old regime. In the long term, 
however, support for new democracies must be performance based. Support cannot 
survive indefinitely unless citizens perceive its performance as providing some 
reasonable measure of individual and collective goods […].” (p. 79) 
Moving on to specific performance criteria, when it comes to new democracies, the 
agreement among first-generation scholars is that support is ultimately contingent on the 
delivery of economic goods. According to Przeworski (1991), in such contexts, popular 
support for the regime as well as its ultimate survival hinge on its ability to deliver 
material well-being to the citizenry and all politically relevant elites. Second-generation 
scholars would disagree, however, and argue that the effective delivery of political goods 
such as the protection of rights and freedoms, effective governance, and interest 
representation are equally if not more important than the delivery of economic goods 
(Bratton / Mattes 2001; Evans / Whitefield 1995; Mattes / Bratton 2007). The study of 
support in older democracies offers no definite conclusions on whether it is political or 
economic goods that should ultimately matter (e.g., Pharr / Putnam 2000). 
The theory advanced here does not seek to settle debates about whether economic or 
political performance is more important in absolute terms. It does, however, advance an 
argument regarding how and why the importance of these criteria might vary across new 
and old democracies. To develop these arguments, the paper builds on the cultural 
approach’s contention that the performance criteria that citizens use in their judgements 
may change depending on context. 
In older democracies, the regime is more likely to be judged for its capacity to guarantee 
rights and protect freedoms, to represent interests, and to allow citizens to provide input to 
those who govern as well as hold them accountable (Inglehart / Welzel 2005). This is not 
to say that the provision of political goods is not important in new democracies; in fact, 
this type of performance should also matter and, as was already mentioned, existing 
empirical evidence indicates that it does. However, the importance of political 
performance in shaping support for democracy should increase as a democracy grows 
older. In contrast, in new democracies, economic concerns are usually more salient, 
and support for democracy is more likely to be shaped by the regime’s capacity to 
address them (Przeworski 1991), at least to a greater extent than in older democracies. 
Thus, one would expect the importance of economic performance to decline as a 
democracy grows older. Hence the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.A: The effect of economic performance on support for democracy should 
decrease as a democracy grows older. 
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Hypothesis 2.B: The effect of political performance on support for democracy should 
increase as a democracy grows older. 
The corollary of these hypotheses is that, in relative terms, regime support should become 
more contingent on political performance than on economic performance as a democracy 
grows older. Said in other words, the relative effect of political performance, defined as 
the ratio of the effect of political performance to the effect of economic performance, 
should be higher in older than in younger democracies. This expectation is reflected in the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.C: The effect of political performance relative to that of economic 
performance on support for democracy should increase as a democracy 
grows older.  
Given that older democracies tend to also be more affluent (Przeworski et al. 2000), one 
must consider whether it is experience with democracy or level of economic development 
that accounts for these expected differences. Culturalists would suggest that economic 
development is the likely culprit. By raising living standards, economic development 
makes economic concerns less salient while nurturing post-materialist values. As a 
consequence of these processes, the importance of economic performance should decline, 
while individuals’ appreciation of the political goods that democracy can deliver should 
increase. 
In contrast, this paper attributes the changes in the determinants of support across new and 
old democracies to democratic experience. As argued by Diamond (1999, 162) the 
political becomes more autonomous vis-à-vis the socio-economic the longer the 
experience with democracy. Indeed, it is not unrealistic to think of citizens in new 
democracies as being only partially tuned in to the workings of this type of regime. In 
such contexts, it is likely that the new regime will be expected to bring about economic 
growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, and so on. Democracy, however, will 
probably not fulfil all these expectations. Only experience with the regime can teach 
citizens what not to expect from democracy, while at the same time leading them to expect 
from it what it can deliver: the protection of political rights and freedoms, deliberation, 
representation of interest, and procedures to hold elected officials accountable. These 
arguments are consistent with the idea that a civic culture follows from democracy and not 
the other way around (Schmitter / Karl 1991, 57).4 
Hypothesis 3: Democratic experience, and not level of economic development, should 
condition the effects of economic and political performance on support for 
democracy as described by hypotheses 2.A and 2.B. 
                                                 
4  For a formalization of a somewhat similar set of arguments see Svolik (2013). According to this paper, 
voters in new democracies have yet to learn that elections provide them with an effective way to hold 
governments accountable. Only after voters have accumulated enough experience with well-performing 
and poorly performing governments, rewarding the former and punishing the latter at the voting booth, 
are they able to separate the performance of the incumbent from that of the regime. It is at this stage 
that democracy finally becomes consolidated. 
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4 Empirical strategy 
Evaluating the hypotheses laid out above requires a combination of individual-level and 
country-level data. At the individual level, it requires cross-national survey data capturing 
attitudes towards democracy, evaluations of economic and political performance, and 
other important covariates. At the country level, it requires variables measuring experience 
with democracy and level of economic development. 
The surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2008 
provide the public opinion data used in the analysis below. LAPOP studied a total of 24 
countries in the Americas that year, with each survey being carried out using a national 
probability design.5 For practical reasons, 21 out of the 24 countries are considered for the 
analysis: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.6 
Unlike most previous research, the focus on Latin America is not motivated by a desire to 
explain support for democracy in that particular region. Rather, Latin America is viewed 
as a particular – and arguably ideal – context in which the theory just developed can be 
examined, given that the region comprises both young and old and poor and wealthy 
countries. Indeed, the number of years of continuous democracy ranges from zero in the 
case of Ecuador, Haiti and Venezuela to over 50 years in the case of Colombia and Costa 
Rica, while gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) 
ranges from US$ 1,173 in Haiti to US$ 15,274 in Chile. 
Dependent variables 
LAPOP surveys contain two items that have been widely used to measure support for 
democracy: the first one is the “satisfaction with democracy” (SWD) item; the second, the 
“commitment to democracy” (CTD) item.7 The SWD item asks respondents to express 
their overall levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their countries. In the 
LAPOP surveys, the item was worded as follows: “In general, would you say that you are 
very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy functions 
in [name of the country]?” 
In turn, the CTD item prompts respondents to show their agreement with a statement 
about democracy being better than other forms of governments. In the LAPOP surveys, 
the item was worded as follows: “How much do you agree with the following statement? 
‘Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.’ 
[Choose a number between 1 and 7, where 1 means ‘not at all’ and 7 means ‘a great 
deal’.]” 
                                                 
5  For comprehensive information about these surveys, please refer to LAPOP (2013). 
6  Canada and the US are excluded from the analysis because the surveys in these countries did not 
capture a number of necessary demographic covariates. Belize is excluded because the regime type 
variable used to calculate democratic experience – the Polity2 score of the Polity IV Project (Marshall, 
Gurr / Jaggers 2013) – was not available for this country. 
7  See for example Anderson (s. a.), Anderson / Guillory (1997), Bratton / Mattes (2001), Evans /  
Whitefield (1995), Karp / Banducci / Bowler (2003) and Sarsfield / Echegaray (2006). 
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Responses to both items are rescaled so that they range from zero to ten, with higher 
numbers indicating more positive attitudes toward democracy. The variables are treated as 
continuous. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the two 
dependent variables for the 21 countries included in the analysis. 
Although items capturing satisfaction with democracy and commitment to democracy 
have been used in numerous studies, their use is not free of criticism. Canache / Mondak / 
Seligson (2001), for example, question the validity of the SWD on the grounds that it taps 
into both specific and diffuse dimensions of support and that the criteria that individuals 
focus on to make an assessment vary substantially across individuals and countries. In a 
more general critique, Rose / Mishler / Haerpfer (1998) and Mishler / Rose (2001b) 
question items that make direct references to “democracy” in their wording. Since 
democracy has different meanings for different respondents, they advocate the use of 
items that assess attitudes towards democracy in concrete terms and in the form of 
comparison with plausible regime alternatives. These are valid points to keep in mind 
when discussing the results, as the use of alternative measures to SWD and CTD is 
precluded by data availability. It is worth noting that focusing on a region with a relatively 
homogeneous culture and common history like Latin America might help mitigate some 
of the concerns about the conceptual equivalence of measures referring to democracy. 
Independent variables 
The first set of individual-level covariates comprises regime performance assessments. 
The economic performance variable combines responses to four items that ask 
respondents to evaluate the present state of the national economy, to evaluate the present 
state of their personal economic situation, whether the national economy improved in the 
past 12 months, and whether their personal economic situation improved in the same 
period. Responses to these items were adjusted to a common scale ranging from zero to 
ten, with higher numbers indicating more positive assessments, and then averaged. The 
political performance variable combines answers to three items. The items ask 
respondents to rate the extent to which citizens’ basic rights are protected in their country, 
the extent to which their country’s court system guarantees a fair trial, and the extent to 
which the current government fights corruption. Responses to these items were rescaled 
and averaged following the same procedure used in the case of economic performance. 
In addition to performance assessments, several individual-level control covariates are 
considered. First, respondents’ levels of political tolerance and interpersonal trust are 
included in an effort to control for the effects of values and political culture on support. 
Following Seligson (2004, 31–33), the tolerance variable combines four items that ask 
respondents whether groups they disagree with should be allowed to vote, to demonstrate 
peacefully, to run for office, and to make political speeches. Answers to these items are 
rescaled to range from zero to ten, with higher values indicating higher levels of tolerance, 
and then averaged. The trust variable is constructed using an item that asks respondents 
to rate the degree to which people in their communities are trustworthy. Responses are 
also transformed to a zero-to-ten scale, with ten indicating the highest degree of 
trustworthiness. 
The remaining individual-level covariates capture respondents’ demographic and socio-
economic characteristics: gender, area of residence (urban vs. rural), age, educational 
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attainment and wealth. Gender and area of residence are dichotomous variables that are 
“1” if the respondent is a woman and resides in a rural area, respectively. Age and 
educational attainment are measured in raw number of years. To measure wealth, first an 
asset ownership index is calculated, following Córdova (2009). The index combines 11 
items that ask respondents whether they own specific household assets, using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). The scores are then used to produce an ordinal variable 
(which is treated as continuous in the analyses) indicating the decile of the index’s 
distribution to which the respondent belongs. The PCA and the classification into deciles 
are carried out independently for each country. 
Moving on to country-level covariates, experience with democracy is operationalized as 
the number of years that a country has been continuously democratic. To calculate this 
figure, countries are classified as democratic and non-democratic, using the Polity Score 
(or Polity2) variable of the Polity IV Project (Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2013). This score 
ranges from -10 to 10, with higher scores indicating more democratic characteristics. 
Following common practice (e.g., Blaydes / Kayser 2011; Brown 2000), the Polity Scores 
are used to produce a dichotomous measure of regime type; scores of 6 or higher are 
classified as democracies, while the remainder are classified as non-democracies. This 
score is available since independence for the 22 countries being analysed. In turn, a 
country’s level of economic development is operationalized by its GDP per capita (PPP) 
(in thousands of US dollars). This indicator is taken from the World Development 
Indicators database (World Bank 2013). 
The descriptive statistics of all the independent variables are presented in Table A.2 in the 
Appendix. Table A.3 provides the wording of the items used to construct the economic 
and political performance assessment variables, as well as the tolerance and trust 
indicators. 
Model 
Until fairly recently, most studies analysing cross-national survey data were carried out 
either by data pooling or by performing single-country analyses first and then casually 
comparing the results of these analyses (Jusko / Shively 2005, 327–328). The study of 
support for democracy was no exception. Anderson and Guillory (1997), for example, 
pooled survey data from Western European countries and then analysed the effects of 
country-level and individual-level covariates on satisfaction with democracy. Bratton and 
Mattes (2001) employed the casual comparison approach in their analysis of support for 
democracy in three African countries.8 
The use of either of these strategies has major limitations, however. On the one hand, 
applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation techniques to pooled data has 
implications for the inferences one can draw about parameter estimates. Since cross-
national survey data feature individuals nested in countries, the classic assumption of non-
correlation between disturbances across observations is violated. Under these conditions, 
standard errors will no longer be accurate and any inferences drawn from them will be 
misleading. On the other hand, the “casual comparison” approach leads to a loss of the 
                                                 
8  For an exception that employs multilevel models see Mattes / Bratton (2007). 
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large-N structure of the data and cannot provide estimates of the effects of country-level 
covariates on the dependent variable of interest (Jusko / Shively 2005, 328). Multilevel 
models solve these limitations by taking the clustered nature of the data into account and 
making use of the large-N structure of cross-national survey data. 
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, employing multilevel models is important for 
substantive, theoretical reasons (Steenbergen / Jones 2002, 219). First, the use of these 
models allows for building and testing comprehensive models by specifying predictors at 
multiple levels of analysis. Second, by allowing parameters to vary across units of analysis, 
multilevel models are sensitive to the possibility of causal heterogeneity. For these reasons, 
multilevel models can be of great utility in bridging the above-mentioned gap between 
aggregate-level and individual-level theories and analyses of support. 
The following is the individual-level, or level-one, equation of a multilevel model of 
support for democracy. The equation expresses the level of support corresponding to 
individual i nested in country j (SDij) – which is measured using SWD or CTD – as a 
linear function of an intercept and individual-level covariates: 
ijijijjijjjij ZPOLPERFECPERFSD εωβββ ++++= '210     (1) 
where ECPERFij and POLPERFij represent the individual’s economic and political 
performance assessments, respectively; Zij is a vector containing individual-level control 
covariates; and εij is a disturbance term. The subscript j in the intercept and the parameters 
associated with economic and political performance assessments indicate that these are 
expected to vary across countries, the level-two units of the multilevel model. The fact 
that the parameter vector ω has no such subscript indicates that the effects of the control 
covariates are assumed to remain constant across countries. 
In turn, the expectation that the effects of performance assessments would be conditioned 
by countries’ experience with democracy is translated in the following level-two 
equations: 
jjj YEARS 111101 νγγβ ++=         (2) 
jjj YEARS 221202 νγγβ ++=         (3) 
Equation (2) corresponds to the parameter associated with economic performance; 
equation (3), to the parameter associated with political performance. These equations 
indicate that both parameters of interest are a linear function of an intercept, the years of 
continuous democracy that a country has experienced (YEARSj), and a disturbance term. 
To evaluate whether democratic experience mediates the effects of performance 
assessments after controlling for level of economic development (DEVj), one could easily 
add the latter variable to equations (2) and (3). 
jjjj DEVYEARS 11211101 νγγγβ +++=       (4) 
jjjj DEVYEARS 22221202 νγγγβ +++=       (5) 
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In addition, the model also considers the possibility that democratic experience shapes 
support independently of performance assessments. As shown in equation (6) below, the 
country-specific intercepts are modelled as a linear function of a common intercept, the 
years of continuous democracy that a country has experienced, and a disturbance term. 
jjj YEARS 001000 νγγβ ++=         (6) 
As before, one could add a country’s level of economic development to (6) and evaluate 
whether this covariate has an effect on support for democracy independently of 
performance assessments: 
jjjj DEVYEARS 00201000 νγγγβ +++=       (7) 
Taken together, (2), (3) and (6) comprise the level-2 portion of the model. To obtain the 
full multilevel model, (2), (3) and (6) are substituted into (1). After multiplying through 
and regrouping the following equation is obtained: 
+++++= ijijjijjij POLPERFECPERFYEARSECPERFYEARSSD 2010100100 * γγγγγ  
ijijjijjjijijj POLPERFECPERFZPOLPERFYEARS ενννωγ +++++ 21021 '*  (8) 
Alternatively, one could substitute (4), (5) and (7) into (1) to obtain a different model that 
also includes level of economic development and its interaction with economic and 
political performance. The corresponding equation would be: 
+++++= ijjijjjij ECPERFYEARSECPERFDEVYEARSSD *1110020100 γγγγγ  
+++ ijjijijj POLPERFYEARSPOLPERFECPERFDEV ** 212012 γγγ  
ijijjijjjijijj POLPERFECPERFZPOLPERFDEV ενννωγ +++++ 21022 '*   (9) 
The parameters of the models are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE).9 
                                                 
9  To implement MLE, the following assumptions about the disturbances are made: (1) E[ν0j] = E[ν1j] = 
E[ν2j] = E[εij] = 0; (2) Var[ν0j]  = τ00, Var[ν1j] = τ11, Var[ν2j] = τ22, Var[εij] = σ2; (3) Cov[ν0j,εij] = 
Cov [ν1j,εij] = Cov[ν2j,εij] = 0; (4) covariances between level-2 disturbances (Cov[ν0j,ν1j], 
Cov[ν0j,ν2j], and Cov[ν1j,ν2j]) may differ from zero; (5) the level-1 disturbance is normally 
distributed; and, (6) the level-2 disturbances follow a multivariate normal distribution. 
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5 Results and discussion 
Table 1 presents the estimation results corresponding to two model specifications for the 
two measures of support: satisfaction with democracy (SWD) and commitment to 
democracy (CTD). The first specification, “No Country-Level Covariates” (Model 1 and 
Model 2), includes only economic and political performance assessments, individual-level 
controls, and a random intercept. This specification is included to initially evaluate the 
hypothesis about the effect of performance on support for democracy before introducing 
country-level covariates. The second specification, “Country-Level Covariate: Years of 
Democracy” (Model 3 and Model 4), adds democratic experience and its interaction with 
performance assessments. 
The results for Model 1 and Model 2 provide initial support for Hypothesis 1. They 
indicate that economic and political performance assessments have positive and 
statistically significant effects on support for democracy, even after controlling for values 
and socio-economic covariates. The effects of both types of assessments are similar on a 
given measure of regime support. It is also worth noting that the effects of both types of 
assessments are substantially higher in the case of SWD. This is in line with the 
conceptual and measurement discussions of support for democracy, indicating that items 
gauging satisfaction with democracy should be more reflective of performance than items 
tapping into commitment to democracy in the abstract. 
Model 3 and Model 4 evaluate whether the effects of economic and political performance 
assessments are conditioned by experience with democracy. Figure 1 illustrates their 
marginal effects on both measures of support for democracy. Panel A shows that the effect 
of economic performance on SWD decreases from 0.25 points in countries with no 
democratic experience to 0.16 points in countries with 100 years of democratic experience. 
In the case of CTD, the decline in the effect of economic performance is more pronounced. 
As shown in Panel B, the effect begins at 0.09 points in countries with no democratic 
experience, becoming not statistically different from zero by the time a country has 
experienced 64 or more years of continuous democracy. These results are in line with 
Hypothesis 2.A, which indicates that the effect of economic performance should decrease 
as a democracy grows older. 
Panels C and D respectively show the marginal effects of political performance on SWD 
and CTD. In countries with no democratic experience, the effect of political performance 
on SWD is 0.24 points, while its effect on CTD is 0.08 points. The change in these effects 
due to democratic experience is not statistically significant. Thus, the results do not 
provide support for Hypothesis 2.B, which indicates that the effect of political 
performance should increase as a democracy grows older. 
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Table 1: Multilevel models of support for democracy, full sample 
 
      No Country-Level               Covariates  
Country-Level Covariate:         
Years of Democracy 
                             
                             
      SWD CTD  SWD CTD 
      Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
                             
                             
Individual Level                          
  Economic Performance     0,2286 ***  0,0625 ***   0,2456 ***   0,0925 ***
      (0,0153)    (0,0134)     (0,0165)     (0,0153)   
  Years of Democracy* 
Economic Performance 
               -0,0009 **   -0,0011 ***
                 (0,0003)     (0,0003)   
  Political Performance     0,2463 ***  0,0934 **   0,2414 ***   0,0785 * 
      (0,0149)    (0,0280)     (0,0190)     (0,0361)   
  Years of Democracy* 
Political Performance 
               0,0001     0,0005   
                 (0,0003)     (0,0007)   
  Tolerance     -0,0195 *  0,1554 ***   -0,0175 *   0,1520 ***
      (0,0082)    (0,0176)     (0,0077)     (0,0170)   
  Trust     0,0588 ***  0,0709 ***   0,0588 ***   0,0688 ***
      (0,0117)    (0,0135)     (0,0115)     (0,0130)   
  Female     0,0150    -0,0696     0,0111     -0,0688   
      (0,0371)    (0,0375)     (0,0376)     (0,0375)   
  Rural     0,1038    0,0392     0,1070 *   0,0502   
      (0,0530)    (0,0569)     (0,0519)     (0,0533)   
  Education     -0,0221 ***  0,0379 ***   -0,0216 ***   0,0374 ***
      (0,0049)    (0,0070)     (0,0049)     (0,0068)   
  Age     0,0042 ***  0,0373 ***   0,0040 ***   0,0374 ***
      (0,0011)    (0,0076)     (0,0011)     (0,0073)   
  Age2          -0,0003 **         -0,0003 ***
           (0,0001)           (0,0001)   
  Asset Ownership     -0,0190 *  -0,0006     -0,0184 *   0,0003   
      (0,0084)    (0,0106)     (0,0080)     (0,0101)   
                             
Country Level                          
  Years of Democracy                0,0104 *   0,0059   
                 (0,0043)     (0,0059)   
  Constant     2,8658 ***  3,9326 ***   2,6368 ***   3,7909 ***
      (0,1603)    (0,3229)     (0,1940)     (0,3755)   
                             
                             
Observations     31817    31599     31817     31599   
Countries     21    21     21     21   
AIC   124774,40 135401,00  124692,70 135238,10 
                             
* prob<0.05; ** prob<0.01; *** prob<0.001.                  
Note: Estimated variance components are omitted to economize space; they are presented in 
Table A.4 in the Appendix.                        
Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013). 
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Taken together, these results regarding both economic and political performance provide 
support for Hypothesis 2.C regarding the relative effect of political performance. In 
countries with no experience with democracy, the effects of economic and political 
performance are similar. Because the effect of economic performance declines and that of 
political performance does not change as a democracy grows older, the effect of political 
performance relative to that of economic performance increases. This suggests that 
individuals increasingly focus on political goods relative to economic goods when making 
judgements about democracy as they gain more experience with the regime. 
Table 2 presents the estimation results corresponding to additional models that examine 
whether it is actually level of economic development, rather than experience with democracy, 
that explains these results. The table presents the results corresponding to two model 
specifications. Model 5 and Model 6 evaluate whether democratic experience continues to 
condition the effects of economic performance on SWD and CTD, respectively, after 
controlling for economic development. To further explore whether level of economic 
development conditions the effects of performance on support for democracy, Model 7 and 
Model 8 only consider this country-level covariate, excluding democratic experience. 
The results for Model 5 and Model 6 indicate that democratic experience continues to 
condition the effect of economic performance as expected after controlling for level of 
economic development. Thus, at any given level of development, the effect of economic 
performance on support for democracy decreases as a democracy grows older. In addition, 
results from Model 6 indicate that level of economic development increases the effect of 
economic performance on CTD at any given level of democratic experience. In the case of 
political performance, the results from both models indicate that neither democratic 
performance nor level of economic development appears to condition the effect of 
political performance.10 
In turn, the results for Model 7 and Model 8 reveal that level of development does not 
condition the effects of either economic performance or political performance when 
democratic experience is not included in the specification. These results further undermine 
the culturalist claim that level of development should be what conditions the effects of 
performance on support for democracy. Altogether, the results from Table 2 provide 
support for Hypothesis 3 when it comes to economic performance: democratic experience, 
and not level of economic development, conditions its effect on support for democracy. 
The effect of political performance does not appear to be conditioned by either democratic 
performance or level of economic development. 
 
 
                                                 
10  It is worth noting that, according to the results from Model 6, the effect of political performance on 
CTD is not statistically significant for any given combination of democratic experience and level of 
economic development. Estimations not presented here show that this effect is significant when the 
interaction of political performance with level of economic development is not included in the 
specification. 
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Table 2: Additional multilevel models of support for democracy, full sample 
                             
                             
      Country-Level Covariates: Years and GDP per Capita  
Country-Level Covariate:   
GDP per Capita 
                             
                             
      SWD CTD  SWD CTD 
      Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 
                             
                             
Individual Level                          
  Economic Performance     0,2137 ***  0,0472 *   0,1987 ***   0,0275   
      (0,0218)    (0,0237)     0,0226     0,0228    
  Years of Democracy* 
Economic Performance 
    -0,0009 **  -0,0012 ***             
      (0,0003)    (0,0003)               
  GDP per Capita* 
Economic Performance 
    0,0038    0,0053 **   0,0028     0,0041   
      (0,0030)    (0,0020)     0,0030     0,0025    
  Political Performance     0,2186 ***  0,0628     0,2185 ***   0,0749   
      (0,0366)    (0,0623)     0,0357     0,0616    
  Years of Democracy* 
Political Performance 
    0,0000    0,0008               
      (0,0002)    (0,0009)               
  GDP per Capita* 
Political Performance 
    0,0028    0,0014     0,0029     0,0024   
      (0,0031)    (0,0061)     0,0031     0,0059    
  Tolerance     -0,0176 *  0,1517 ***   -0,0176 *   0,1518 ***
      (0,0077)    (0,0170)     0,0077     0,0169    
  Trust     0,0587 ***  0,0688 ***   0,0589 ***   0,0688 ***
      (0,0115)    (0,0131)     0,0115     0,0130    
  Female     0,0115    -0,0680     0,0116     -0,0673   
      (0,0378)    (0,0375)     0,0377     0,0377    
  Rural     0,1076 *  0,0502     0,1078 *   0,0504   
      (0,0520)    (0,0529)     0,0522     0,0526    
  Education     -0,0216 ***  0,0375 ***   -0,0217 ***   0,0374 ***
      (0,0048)    (0,0068)     0,0048     0,0069    
  Age     0,0040 ***  0,0372 ***   0,0040 ***   0,0373 ***
      (0,0011)    (0,0073)     0,0011     0,0073    
  Age2          -0,0003 ***         -0,0003 ***
           (0,0001)           0,0001    
  Asset Ownership     -0,0183 *  0,0005     -0,0183 *   0,0002   
      (0,0080)    (0,0102)     0,0081     0,0101    
                             
Country Level                          
  Years of Democracy     0,0100 *  0,0050               
      (0,0044)    (0,0064)               
  GDP per Capita     0,0216    0,0351     0,0327     0,0403   
      (0,0290)    (0,0564)     0,0320     0,0545    
  Constant     2,4606 ***  3,5089 ***   2,6103 ***   3,5833 ***
      (0,3473)    (0,4442)     0,3372     0,4541    
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With regard to the control variables, it is worth discussing those effects that are robust to 
model specification. First, tolerance has a negative and significant effect on SWD and a 
positive and significant effect on CTD, while trust has a positive and significant effect on 
both measures of support. Second, educational attainment has a negative and significant 
effect on SWD and a positive and significant effect on CTD. Third, age has a positive and 
significant effect on SWD, while its effect on CTD decreases with age itself. More 
specifically, the effect of age on CTD is positive and significant for the youngest 
individuals, becoming progressively smaller with age, and failing to statistically differ 
from zero after the age of 68. Fourth, the asset ownership index, a proxy for wealth, has a 
negative and significant effect on SWD and no statistically significant effect on CTD. 
Norris’s (1999a) notion of “critical citizens” – i.e., citizens who distrust political 
institutions and authorities and set increasingly higher standards of regime performance 
while according a great value to democracy – is useful for coming to terms with the 
findings pertaining to tolerance and trust. While high levels of both tolerance and trust are 
indicative of democratic values, the first variable would be more closely related to the 
post-modern values that characterize critical citizens. This would explain why more 
tolerant individuals are less satisfied with, but more committed to, democracy. The 
acquisition of these post-modern values would similarly explain the results corresponding 
to educational attainment and wealth.11 With regard to age, the results indicate that support 
for democracy changes with the life cycle. All else equal, younger individuals are the least 
satisfied with and the least committed to democracy; middle-aged adults are moderately 
satisfied with democracy and the most committed to the regime; and the elderly are the 
most satisfied with democracy, but no more committed to it than middle-aged adults. 
To sum up, the evidence discussed here indicates: that better economic and political 
performance is associated with higher levels of support for democracy, even after 
controlling for values and socio-economic covariates (Hypothesis 1); that the effect of 
economic performance on support decreases as a democracy grows older (Hypothesis 
2.A); that, as a consequence of this decrease, the effect of political performance relative to 
that of economic performance increases as a democracy grows older (Hypothesis 2.C); 
                                                 
11  More educated individuals would have acquired post-modern values and thus set higher standards of 
regime performance while showing greater commitment to democracy in the abstract. Wealthier 
individuals would have also acquired post-modern values, albeit to a lesser extent. This would in turn 
make them more demanding of performance, but not more committed to democracy than less wealthy 
individuals. 
Table 2 (continued):  Additional multilevel models of support for democracy, full sample 
Observations     31817    31599     31817     31599   
Countries     21    21     21     21   
AIC   124695,20 135238,30  124698,40 135244,40 
                             
* prob<0.05; ** prob<0.01; *** prob<0.001.                  
Note: Estimated variance components are omitted to economize space; they are presented in 
Table A.5 in the Appendix.                        
 
Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013). 
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and that democratic experience, not level of economic development, is what conditions the 
effects of economic performance on support (Hypothesis 3). 
The evidence also provides some important insights about the measurement of support for 
democracy. Clearly, satisfaction with democracy and commitment to democracy measure 
different types of support. As discussed above, satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is 
more reflective of economic and political performance than commitment to democracy 
(CTD). And this indicates that the former item measures support at a lower level of 
abstraction than the latter item. Given this difference, it should not be surprising to find 
that higher levels of education, for example, lead citizens to be more dissatisfied with the 
way democracy works, but more committed to principles that the regime embodies. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has developed and assessed a comprehensive theory of support for democracy. 
Using insights from both instrumental and cultural approaches, this theory argues that 
performance considerations shape support, but that the importance of these performance 
criteria is conditioned by democratic experience. Specifically, it argues that the importance 
of economic performance should decrease as a democracy grows older, while the 
importance of political performance should increase. These parallel processes would lead to 
support for democracy being increasingly shaped by political performance in relative terms. 
The theory attributes these differences to democratic experience, rather than to level of 
economic development. 
The empirical analysis lends clear support for the argument that performance shapes 
support for democracy, with the importance of economic performance declining with 
democratic experience. While the importance of political performance does not seem to be 
conditioned by democratic experience, its importance relative to economic performance 
does increase as a democracy matures. The results indicate that citizens of countries with 
little democratic experience tend to give economic and political performance similar 
weight when making judgements about the regime, but that economic performance is 
given substantially less weight than political performance in more mature democracies. 
Finally, the evidence shows that experience with democracy, and not level of economic 
development, is what explains these differences across new and old democracies. 
This paper has important implications for understanding the role that mass support for 
democracy might play in democratic consolidation. Citizens of new democracies tend to 
expect the new regime to deliver economic prosperity to the same extent as they expect it 
to deliver political goods. It is at this stage, then, that support for the regime can be 
substantially undermined by poor economic performance. Such a decline in support might 
signal to anti-democratic actors that they might not face strong public opposition if they 
were to act against the regime. If economic performance is calamitous, a sharp decline in 
support for democracy might even be the prelude to active mass opposition to the regime. 
Democracies that are able to deliver reasonable economic performance, and weather potential 
storms as they grow older, will give their citizens a chance to become tuned in to the workings 
of the regime. As a result, they will give economic performance progressively less weight in 
their judgements, and mass support for democracy will become less reflective of the 
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regime’s economic record. In the extreme, once a democracy has matured enough, its 
citizens will evaluate the regime only on the basis of its political performance – that is, on 
the extent to which it provides political goods such as the protection of rights and 
freedoms, opportunities for deliberation and accountability, and effective representation. 
In short, this paper suggests that support for democracy and a civic culture that values the 
political goods that democracy can deliver are more likely to be a consequence of, rather 
than a prerequisite for, the survival and eventual consolidation of democracy. 
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Table A 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables, by country 
                                  
Country 
Satisfaction with Democracy (SWD)  Commitment with Demcoracy (CTD) 
                              
                              
Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
                                  
                                  
  Argentina   1391     5,06   2,18    1396     8,69     2,23  
  Bolivia   2836     5,01   2,28    2821     7,05     2,41  
  Brazil   1394     5,35   2,34    1355     7,05     2,85  
  Chile   1446     4,86   2,12    1444     6,95     2,66  
  Colombia   1410     5,18   2,36    1426     7,30     2,64  
  Costa Rica   1457     6,55   2,44    1429     7,82     2,83  
  Dominican Republic   1425     5,45   2,25    1371     7,49     2,95  
  Ecuador   2919     5,33   2,19    2901     6,48     2,83  
  El Salvador   1518     4,49   2,46    1511     6,84     2,86  
  Guatemala   1403     5,26   2,15    1307     6,05     3,18  
  Guyana   2304     4,93   2,48    2239     6,94     2,82  
  Haiti   1467     3,92   2,89    1497     6,66     2,85  
  Honduras   1410     4,52   2,25    1415     5,99     2,95  
  Jamaica   1427     4,91   2,42    1416     7,39     2,79  
  Mexico   1497     5,09   2,28    1488     6,85     2,90  
  Nicaragua   1436     4,66   2,43    1352     7,29     3,13  
  Panama   1493     5,37   2,58    1499     7,16     2,80  
  Paraguay   1148     3,05   2,44    1092     6,29     3,34  
  Peru   1437     4,31   2,06    1443     6,55     2,57  
  Uruguay   1460     6,12   2,08    1466     8,53     2,37  
  Venezuela   1439     5,92   2,79    1459     8,38     2,36  
                                  
 
Source:  Own calculations using LAPOP (2013). 
Table A 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
                              
Variables   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
                              
Individual Level:                           
  Economic Performance     35445   4,10   2,24   0      10    
  Political Performance     35122   4,47   2,32   0      10    
  Tolerance     34368   5,49   2,76   0      10    
  Trust     34793   5,78   2,97   0      10    
  Female     35483   0,51   0,50   0      1    
  Rural     35483   0,37   0,48   0      1    
  Education     35164   8,95   4,49   0      18    
  Age     35404   38,99   15,85   16      99    
  Asset Ownership     35265   5,36   2,88   1      10    
Country Level:                           
  Years     35483   23,63   26,61   0      134    
  GDP per Capita     35483   8,47   3,74   1,17      15,27    
                              
 
Source:  Own calculations using LAPOP (2013). 
Luis A. Camacho 
28 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Table A 3: Wording of items used to construct independent variables 
          
Variables/Items  Item Wording  Response Scale 
          
          
Economic Performance    
          
  
Sociotropic 
 
How would you describe the country’s 
economic situation? Would you say that it is 
very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or 
very bad? 
 
1-to-5, “very good,” “good,” 
“neither good nor bad,” 
“bad,” and “very bad” 
          
  
Retrospective 
Sociotropic 
 
Do you think that the country’s current 
economic situation is better than, the same as or 
worse than it was 12 months ago? 
 1-to-3, “better,” “same,” and “worse” 
          
  
Pocketbook 
 
How would you describe your overall economic 
situation? Would you say that it is very good, 
good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? 
 
1-to-5, “very good,” “good,” 
“neither good nor bad,” 
“bad,” and “very bad” 
          
  
Retrospective 
Pocketbook 
 
Do you think that your economic situation is 
better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 
months ago?  
 1-to-3, “better,” “same,” and “worse” 
          
          
Political Performance    
          
  
Basic Rights 
 
To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic 
rights are well protected by the political system 
of (country)? 
 1-to-7, with 1 meaning “Not at all” and 7 meaning “A lot” 
          
  
Fair Trial 
 
To what extent do you think the courts in 
(country) guarantee a fair trial?  
1-to-7, with 1 meaning “Not 
at all” and 7 meaning “A lot” 
          
  
Corruption 
 
To what extent would you say the current 
administration combats government corruption?  
1-to-7, with 1 meaning “Not 
at all” and 7 meaning “A lot” 
          
          
Tolerance       
          
  
Right to Vote 
 
There are people who only say bad things about 
the (country) form of government, not just the 
incumbent government but the system of 
government. How strongly do you approve or 
disapprove of such people’s right to vote? 
 
1-to-10, with 1 meaning 
“Strongly disapprove” and 10 
meaning “Strongly approve” 
          
  
Peaceful 
Demonstration 
 
How strongly do you approve or disapprove of 
such people being allowed to conduct peaceful 
demonstrations in order to express their views? 
 
1-to-10, with 1 meaning 
“Strongly disapprove” and 10 
meaning “Strongly approve” 
          
  
Run for Public 
Office 
 
Still thinking of those who only say bad things 
about the (country) form of government, how 
strongly do you approve or disapprove of such 
people being permitted to run for public office? 
 
1-to-10, with 1 meaning 
“Strongly disapprove” and 10 
meaning “Strongly approve” 
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Table A 3 (continued): Wording of items used to construct independent variables 
  
Make Speeches 
 
How strongly do you approve or disapprove of 
such people appearing on television to make 
speeches? 
 
1-to-10, with 1 meaning 
“Strongly disapprove” and 10 
meaning “Strongly approve” 
          
          
Trust 
 
Now, speaking of the people from here, would 
you say that people in this community are 
generally very trustworthy, somewhat 
trustworthy, not very trustworthy or 
untrustworthy...? 
 
1-to-4, “very trustworthy,” 
“somewhat trustworthy,” “not 
very trustworthy,” and 
“untrustworthy” 
          
 
Source:  LAPOP (2013). 
Table A 4: Variance components estimates corresponding to Table 1 
                      
                     
    No Country-Level             Covariates   
Country-Level Covariate:          
Years of Democracy 
                      
                     
    SWD CTD   SWD CTD 
    Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4 
                      
  
σ(Economic Perf.) 
         0,0387   0,0260 
           (0,0115)   (0,0102) 
  
σ(Political Perf.)     
     0,0478   0,1058 
           (0,0073)   (0,0168) 
  
σ(Intercept)   0,5079 
 0,6039   0,5437   0,7939 
    (0,0913)  (0,0907)   (0,0859)   (0,1178) 
  
σ(Level-1 Residual)   2,2051 
 2,7114   2,1995   2,6997 
    (0,0471)  (0,0585)   (0,0466)   (0,0585) 
                      
Note: All covariances between level-two disturbances are assumed to be zero. 
Source:  Own calculations using LAPOP (2013). 
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Table A 5: Variance Components Estimates Corresponding to Table 2 
                      
                     
    Country-Level Covariates: Years and GDP per Capita   
Country-Level Covariate:   GDP 
per Capita 
                      
                     
    SWD CTD   SWD CTD 
    Model 5 Model 6   Model 7 Model 8 
                      
                     
  
σ(Economic Perf.)   
0,0358   0,0182    0,0430   0,0375 
    (0,0096)  (0,0145)   (0,0116)   (0,0151) 
  
σ(Political Perf.)   
0,0462   0,1036    0,0465   0,1054 
    (0,0081)  (0,0157)   (0,0079)   (0,0174) 
  
σ(Intercept)   
0,5305   0,7683    0,5838   0,7790 
    (0,0785)  (0,0963)   (0,1051)   (0,0916) 
  
σ(Level-1 Residual)   
2,1995   2,6997    2,1995   2,6997 
    (0,0466)  (0,0585)   (0,0466)   (0,0585) 
                      
Note: All covariances between level-two disturbances are assumed to be zero. 
 
Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013). 
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